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Power Operation in ISD: Technological Frames 
Perspectives 
Christina Ling-hsing Chang, 




This paper investigates the power operation in information system development (ISD) processes.  Due to the fact that key 
actors in different departments possess different professional knowledge, their different contexts lead to some employees 
supporting IS, while others resist it to achieve their goals.  We aim to interpret these power operations in ISD from the 
theory of technological frames. 
This study is based on qualitative data collected from KaoKang (pseudonym), a port authority in Taiwan.  We attempt to 
understand the situations of different key actors (e.g. top manager, MIS professionals, employees of DP-1 division, 
consultants of KaoKang, and customers (outside users)) who wield power in ISD in different situations.  In this respect, we 
interpret the data using a technological frame.   Finally, we aim to gain fresh insight into power operation in ISD from this 
perspective. 
Keywords 
Information System Development, Power, Technological Frame 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1970s, there have been many academic studies on the effects of information technology (IT) innovation on different 
organizations from the perspectives of power and politics (Chang 2006, 2007; Lawrence et al. 2005; Silva 2003; Jasperson et 
al. 2002; Robey & Boudreau 1999; Sillince & Mouakket 1997; Markus & Robey 1995; Zuboff 1988; Markus 1983; Keen 
1981; Pettigrew 1973).  ISD quickly facilitates the changes in relationships, communication methods, influences, authorities 
and controls among different departments of an organization.  At the same time, it also raises the level of political behavior.  
As IS enables information to be distributed among top managers, it can be used as their source of power to control staff.  IS 
also reduces the bargaining chip of the staff, prompting strong resistance to managerial power to the point of failure (Kling 
1987, Willocks & Mason 1987).  IS professionals and managers have high levels of authority, using IT as an important 
resource in the negotiation process.  Both information system implementation and innovation in technology are intensely 
political issues (Keen 1981).  Zuboff (1988) believes IS influences the authority of middle managers, threatening their 
ability to control; thus, they will challenge and distort resource allocation, and finally resist the implementation of IS. 
In light of this, people in different departments and positions have different perceptions of IT in the ISD process.  Then, 
coexist with the support and against employees in ISD.  For this reason, the present study seeks to interpret the power of 
ISD using a technological frame.  Although a large number of scholars have studied the issue of power and organizational 
politics, it is surprising that to date, no one has adopted the technological frames perspective from which to analyze the way 
in which power is wielded in ISD. 
Redding (1990, 1980), Tricker (1988) and Wong (1985) believe that Chinese leaders are widely perceived to have a natural 
right to determine organizational objectives.  The apparent acceptance of authority could alternatively conceal an insidious 
exercise of power through manipulation.  Nevertheless, Chinese businesses tend to use the entrepreneurial mode of 
strategy-making.  Strategies emphasize the exploiting of opportunities rather than the solving of problems and are made by 
powerful individuals (rather than groups), who frequently rely on personal knowledge and intuition rather than objective 
criteria or formal and quantitative methods.  In the Chinese business culture, although information is a key source of power, 
it is fundamentally a personal asset rather than an organizational resource.  The power structure in a Chinese organization is 
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perhaps best represented as a series of concentric circles with the patriarch in the centre.  Power is maintained by carefully 
controlling key information.  Most management information really is information only for top managers.  Much of it 
remains in a soft form – in the mind of the manager – and is verbally communicated.  Key details, ideas and knowledge are 
selectively passed on to chosen individuals.  This promotes a divide and rule strategy, since no other individual is privy to 
the full information set (Ko 1995; Redding 1990). 
Using qualitative research methods, the aim of the present study is to analyze the power highlighted in the technological 
frames (Orlikowski & Gash 1994).  With regard to the interpretation of the power used by these technological frames, there 
are five kinds of actor of KaoKang: top managers, employees of DP-1 division, MIS professionals, consultants of KaoKang, 
and customers (outside users).  Through the utilization of technological frames, conclusions are drawn and the emerging 
intricate interrelationships are highlighted. 
TECHNOLOGICAL FRAMES 
Bolman and Deal (1991) point out that frames can create a ―psychic prison‖ that inhibits learning because people cannot look 
at old problems in a new light and attack old challenges with different and more powerful tools—they cannot reframe.  In 
view of this, Orlikowski and Gash (1994) believe that individuals have different interpretations of the same things, and thus 
make sense of things differently.  These invisible rules are congruent with a tacit knowledge base.  For this reason, 
applying the theory of frames to technology could have a significant influence on the interaction of people and technology. 
Orlikowski and Gash (1994) believe that an understanding of people’s interpretations of a technology is critical to 
understanding their interaction with it.  People have to make sense of it, and in this sense-making process, they develop 
particular assumptions, expectations and knowledge of the technology, which then serve to shape subsequent actions toward 
it.  They mention that ―this includes not only the nature and role of the technology itself, but the specific conditions, 
applications and consequences of that technology in particular contexts.‖ In light of this, Orlikowski and Gash (1994) assert 
that different groups within an organization may have different technological frames, and introduce the notion of congruence 
to describe the nature and extent of differences among frames.  For this reason, people’s technological frames influence their 
actions toward technology, and different groups may have incongruent technological frames, which could lead to difficulties 
around technological use and change.  This study draws on some findings from a field study analyzing the implementation 
and early use of a new information technology to examine key actors’ interpretations of the technology.  The different 
technological frames imply different ways of knowing and making sense of technology.. 
Altogether, the theory of frames asserts that people’s behavior inhibits their cognitive frame.  However, through 
socialization, interaction, or negotiation, individuals develop common and shared frames in each department.  The 
subculture of each department is capable of influencing the sharing of a particular frame and impeding their capacity to make 
sense of problems outside their department.  In view of this, we should consider that the problems may be induced from the 
different cognitive frame of employees, derived from their belonging to different departments. 
The technological frames will be described in the following sections: 
Orlikowski and Gash (1994) believe that the different cognitive frame of different departments and the resulting conflict is a 
major problem in ISD.  There are three domains of technological frame: nature of technology, technology strategy and 
technology-in-use. 
(1) Nature of technology: refers to people’s images of the technology and their understanding of its capabilities and 
functionality.  Due to the hugely divergent perceptions of IS between MIS professionals and users, MIS professionals cannot 
understand why users are scared of IT and fail to identify the benefits of technology, which would help them to accept it.  At 
the same time, users fear redundancy as the consequence of the implementation of IS, and resent the effort required to learn 
the IS.  Meanwhile, the conflicting cognitive frame between MIS professionals and users provides the seeds for failure. 
(2) Technology strategy: refers to people’s views of why their organization acquired and implemented the technology.  It 
includes their understanding of the motivation or vision behind the adoption decision and its likely value to the organization.  
While MIS professionals regard the technical criteria of success as being focused on deployment, users emphasize the added 
value of technology, a quite different definition of technological success. 
(3) Technology-in-use: refers to people’s understanding of how the technology will be used on a daily basis and the likely or 
actual conditions and consequences associated with such use.  Generally, MIS professionals are only concerned with the 
installation of new technology, not how to use it.  On the other hand, users think that MIS professionals should teach them 
how to use it.  Due to lack of training, the new technology is seen as an inhibitor to understanding and use.  For this reason, 
these two actors display a different cognition. 
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To investigate turbulence and change in problem-setting activities, it can be instructive to consider socio-cognitive effects 
such as frame shifting (El Sawy & Pauchant 1988; Gioia 1986).  Although frames, once formed, are resistant to change 
(Walsh 1995), contextual changes can trigger shifts that bring new knowledge to the forefront of sense-making (Davidson 
2002; Barr 1998; El Sawy & Pauchant 1988; Gioia 1986; Bartunek 1984).  El Sawy and Pauchant (1988) find that frame 
shifts can be abrupt and of short duration; nonetheless, these shifts in frame salience influence the way participants make 
sense of environmental information at that point in time, and the decisions and actions they subsequently take.  Changes that 
trigger a shift in salient technology frames could lead to reinterpretation of information as well as to new understandings of 
IT requirements. 
The concept of technological frames thus forms a powerful and useful complement to other forms of social analyses, such as 
power, control, and resource dependency (Grudin 1988; Gash 1987; Kling & Iacono 1984; Markus 1983).  In an overall 
investigation of technology implementation and use in organizations, both interpretative analysis of technological frames and 
institutional analyses of structural, cultural, and political issues are valuable (Orlikowski & Gash 1994).  Davidson (2002) 
also asserts that power can influence the ISD processes and its consequences. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Interpretative Research Methods 
This study found that IT shifts the resource and power allocation of an organization.  For this reason, employees from 
different departments will wield power in ISD in order to protect their self-interests and influence the direction of IS.  As 
these phenomena continue in a dynamic system and are context-dependent (Pettigrew 1985), this paper uses a qualitative 
method to understand the complicated and interactive processes and to provide fresh insights into the subject area. 
The study focuses on the ISD of KaoKang.  A large number of events were analyzed utilizing an interpretation method.  
Investigations were conducted into the cognition and action of these different actors, and their wielded power processes in 
ISD.  Pettigrew (1985) believes that the researcher should continue to observe the action or structuration processes of 
individuals and groups in order to ascertain the historical and social change processes.  It is necessary to use rational and 
political perspectives at the same time to understand the change in the organization and to explore the way in which 
complicated events occur in a specific organizational, social, economic and political context (Pettigrew 1985). 
Research Design 
Case selection and data collection 
KaoKang has 2000 employees and has had an MIS department for more than twenty years.  It is information-rich and has 
had many occurrences of power-wielding events in the context of ISD.  Intensity sampling was used to select this case, after 
which the snowball sampling method was utilized, through informants, to select the key individuals as our subjects. 
Actor KaoKang Selected subjects 
Top manager DP dept. 2  
Employees of DP-1 Division DP-1 division 4  
MIS Professionals 
MIS dept. 6  
DSE dept. (who were work for MIS dept.) 2  
Consultants of KaoKang 
DP-1 division 1  
DW dept. 2  
Customers Customer 5 
Others 
DRD dept. 1 
DW dept. 2 
Total  2 5  
Table 1. Selected Subject Cases 
In order to understand the cognitive differences of five kinds of actor (top managers, employees of DP-1division, MIS 
employees, consultants of KaoKang and customers) and the way they used their resources to wield power in DSH-IS 
development processes, we had two interviewing phases:  (1) The first phase: from December 2001 to May 2002, explored 
the detailed processes of antecedence, process, and failure outcome of DSH-IS.  (2) The second phase: from January 2005 to 
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July 2005, sought to understand the second-time development processes of DSH-IS.  A total of 25 informants at KaoKang 
were interviewed, with the duration of each interview ranging from 15 minutes to 4 hours, the average range being from 30 
minutes to 1 hour.  The selected case subjects are shown in Table 1. 
All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed.  The data were collected from 6 different departments and 5 customers.  
Four types of data: document data, archival data, unstructured interviews, and observation, were acquired to satisfy the 
requirements of multiple data resource triangulation. 
Case description 
KaoKang, a port authority in Taiwan, was established in 1945.  Employees are government officials and KaoKang has a 
bureaucratic culture.  The salary of employees is higher than other institutions of substantial income.  Employees are of the 
mentality, ―the less they do, the fewer errors they make.‖ 
In the 1960s, the industry, business and economy were thriving, and KaoKang’s operations increased significantly.  Due to 
the limited experience of a number of employees and the complicated business processes, the institution’s performance and 
customer requirements could not be satisfied.  For this reason, computerization was introduced to some aspects of the 
business in 1971 and gradually increased, leading to the establishment of an MIS department in 1974.  The IS used a batch 
method initially, before developing an on-line process in 1977.  The MIS department has three divisions: DM-1, DM-2 and 
DM-3.  For a description of subunits and employee relationships in KaoKang, see Figure 1. 


























































Simon, the new director of KaoKang, inspected each department in 1996.  He found that all but the very loud DP-1 division 
had been computerized.  He then assigned the MIS department to the task of computerizing ship arrangement on the quay 
processes, called DSH-IS.  Due to the fact that Simon had bragged about KaoKang having an IS capable of arranging ships’ 
quays when entering foreign ports, it was necessary to computerize this task.  Six years later, in 2002, the first DSH-IS 
development process was a total failure.  From then on, the global competitive advantage of KaoKang diminished rapidly 
each year, causing the organization to lose its ranking from third to eighth in the world.  In 2004, the director heard that even 
LongKang and ChungKang in Taiwan had IS capable of arranging the quay for a ship when entering a port.  As Kaokang 
could not lag behind these two smaller ports, it began planning the DSH-IS once again in 2004, expecting it to be more 
successful the second time around. 
Data analysis 
Content Analysis was used in this research to analyze the data.  In light of the fact that previous research had shown analysis 
of the steps to be most critical, each theme was defined very clearly, in order to avoid misclassification.  This study analyzed 
data using thematic units elucidated from the respondents’ description of the relevant events of the actors’ cognition and 
power in ISD.  Upon selection of the relevant sentences, each theme was analyzed, a task achieved by the collecting of 
themes and their codification.  Since coding is subjective, it was necessary that all coders should agree on the coding 
criteria. 
The events were ranked based on a time axis, and the data related to actors’ cognition and power were filtered and analyzed.  
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In cases of insufficient data for analysis, the researcher returned to the field to collect more.  The analytic processes were 
repeated to elaborate the causes and interactions of these events.  Each of the 3 analysts (two Ph.D. candidates, and one MIS 
assistant professor) analyzed these data independently, after which pictures and a matrix were used to present and discuss the 
results.  The final results were accepted when two or more analysts agreed.  Those sections that could not be agreed upon 
in this way were examined in greater detail by the MIS assistant professor.  If agreement still could not be reached, the 
findings of that particular section were discarded.  By means of this procedure, the themes selected and the reliability of the 
analysis unit satisfied the requirements of triangulation through multiple analyses. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This study, based on collected data, found that three frame domains derived from the DSH-IS development processes of 
KaoKang could be analyzed.  They were: nature of technology, technology strategy and technology-in-use.  The definition 
of these three frame domains is as follows: 
(1) Nature of technology: refers to people’s images of the DSH-IS and their understanding of its capabilities and 
functionality. 
(2) Technology strategy: refers to people’s views of why their organization acquired and implemented the DSH-IS.  It 
includes their understanding of the motivation or vision behind the adoption decision and its likely value to the 
organization. 
(3) Technology-in-use: refers to people’s understanding of how the DSH-IS will be used on a daily basis and the likely or 
actual conditions and consequences associated with such use. 
Due to the specific setting of KaoKang, this study adopted the frame domains of Orlikowski and Gash (1994).  Analyzed 
were the different cognition, conflicts and contradictions among five kinds of actor in DSH-IS development processes.  The 
first stage of DSH-IS development processes was explained and the reasons for their negative effect on DSH-IS in the second 
stage were given. 
The study analyzed the technological frame differences among five kinds of actor: (1) top manager: including: director, DP 
department manager; (2) employees of DP-1 division: including the leader of DP-1 division and its employees; (3) MIS 
professionals: including the manager of the MIS department and the MIS professionals related to DSH-IS; (4) consultants of 
KaoKang: they were the employees of DP-1 division and others departments with deep understanding of the ship 
arrangement processes; (5) customers (outside users): needed KaoKang to arrange ships on the quay for them. 
Three technological frames did not occur in vacuum, being both time and context dependent on DSH-IS development 
processes.  Therefore, the frame domains that emerged from the KaoKang data embody understanding of what the DSH-IS 
is (the nature of technology), why it was introduced (technology strategy), and how it is used to create various changes in 
work as well as to allow different actors to wield power to influence the direction of DSH-IS in order to protect their power 
and self-interests (technology-in-use). 
This study was based on a two-staged DSH-IS development process, analyzed using three domains of technological frames 
among five kinds of actor.  As the director of KaoKang did not assign the consultants in the first stage of DSH-IS 
(1997~2002), there were only four kinds of actor at this stage (top managers, employees of DP-1 division, MIS professionals 
and customers).  However, in the second stage (2005~), the director of KaoKang assigned the consultants of KaoKang that 
were involved in the second stage of DSH-IS.  It was found that different actors have different perceptions of technological 
frames at the same stage.  The differences will be discussed in the following sections (see Table 2). 
Stages 
Actors 
The First Stage 
(1997~2002) 
 The Second Stage 
(2005~) 
Top managers Nature of Technology: 
DSH-IS could resolve all problems. 
 Nature of Technology: 
DSH-IS was possible due to the progress of 
technology; it would be successful this time. 
Technology Strategy: DSH-IS could raise the 
global image of KaoKang. 
 Technology Strategy: the latter will be the champion. 
Motivation: director told foreign port that 
KaoKang has the IS capable of 
arranging a ship’s quay when ship enters 
port. 
This was related to the "face" of the director. 
Motivation: If LongKang and ChungKang in 
Taiwan have the IS, KaoKang should have 
the same facility. 
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Criteria of success: using computers was the 
goal. 
 Criteria of success: expected customers could do 
this job on-line in their own company. 
Vision: to raise the global competitive 
advantage of KaoKang. 
 Vision: Wished also that KaoKang could raise its 
global competitive advantage. 
Accommodated planning: supported the budget 
of DSH-IS totally and assigned the MIS 
department to take responsibility for it. 
 Accommodated planning: supported the budget of 
DSH-IS totally, outsourcing it and 
assigning a DP department and MIS 
department.  Consultants of KaoKang and 
customers could work together.  The 
manager of DP department piloted the 
proceedings. 
Technology in Use: Irrespective if how it was 
done, it was necessary to use the 
computer. 
 Technology in Use: control the function of DSH-IS, 
which could help top managers maintain 
good relations with privileged clients in 
order to ensure their future promotion. 
Priority: Directed to do it immediately.  And 
accepted customers delegated some 
powerful individuals to resolve issues.  
DSH-IS was a phantom system. 
Priority: asserted DSH-IS should be implemented 
in two phases: prearrange ship on the quay 
before it enters port till everyone has been 
familiarized with DSH-IS; then arrange 
ship on the quay at the time it enters port.  
Then they could respond to privileged 
clients’ requests. 
Policy for quality: If computerized this job 
would be good enough. 
 Policy for quality: the function of manual 
modification could not be eradicated 
Stages 
Actors 
The First Stage 
(1997~2002) 




Nature of Technology: 
DSH-IS was very rigid and inflexible and so 
would not work. 
 Nature of Technology: 
Computerization was possible at this time. 
Technology Strategy: could be manipulated like 
a puppet. 
 Technology Strategy: simplify the rules of ship 
arranging, but with no guarantee of success. 
Motivation: must comply with top managers’ 
directives. 
Motivation: there was a global computerization 
trend, and so the manager of the MIS 
department was co-opted, with the 
expectation that he could share the 
responsibility with them. 
Criteria of success: doubt the ability of 
DSH-IS. 
 Criteria of success: the extent to which DSH-IS is 
accepted by customers. 
Vision: it was a good idea, but it did not work 
and there were no expectations for it. 
 Vision: Wanted to have automation and preserve 
their power and self-interests at the same 
time. 
Accommodated planning: formulated the rules 
of ship arrangement processes for MIS 
department, but only provided 
superficial effort to avoid punishment. 
 Accommodated planning: modified the 
complicated rules and simplified them.  
Did each in response to directive of top 
managers with no judgment. 
Technology in Use: created problems for other 
employees. 
 Technology in Use: avoided involvement in 
conflict of customers for reasons of 
self-preservation. 
Priority: the critical information controllability 
would be transparent after 
computerization, and their jobs would 
be wound down.  Thus, a hit-or-miss 
and make-shift approach to 
computerization. 
Priority: wrote request for proposal (RFP) according 
to top managers’ requirement, in order to 
keep good relationship with top managers. 
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Usefulness: this job was too complicated, 
DSH-IS was too rigid and had no 
flexibly. 
  
Policy for quality: distrusted the result of 
DSH-IS. 
 Policy for quality: adhered completely to top 
managers’ orders. 
 Limitation of job duty: expected customers would 
be able to resolve the problems of ship 
arranging conflicts by themselves. 
Stages 
Actors 
The First Stage 
(1997~2002) 




Nature of Technology: 
Due to complicated nature of the rules of ship 
arranging and the small chances of 
success, it was not the right time to 
develop DSH-IS. 
 Nature of Technology: 
The rules of ship arranging were simplified, DSH-IS 
should achieve its goal. 
Technology Strategy: technique had not come to 
maturity. 
 Technology Strategy: only accommodated DP-1 
division and did not guide it. 
Motivation: the failure of DSH-IS was not his 
responsibility, then passively did this 
job. 
Motivation: MIS department only accommodated 
DP-1 division in order to avoid responsibility 
for its failure. 
Criteria of success: DSH-IS should be 
associated with GIS, and the employees 
of DP-1 division and customers 
accommodated it. 
 Criteria of success: supported DP-1 division and let 
the contract of DSH-IS for them be 
successful. 
Vision: hopelessness.  Vision: no comment. 
Accommodated planning: Hugo used the 
strategy of ―the less he did, the fewer 
errors he would make‖ to introduce 
DSH-IS. 
 Accommodated planning: from promoter to auxiliary 
actor, and obeyed the order of top managers 
only. 
Technology in Use: had second thoughts, then 
did it. 
 Technology in Use: supported the technical side of 
the project only. 
Priority: according to the schedule and did not 
coerce users to use DSH-IS 
Priority: according to the budget schedule. 
Usefulness: the rules of ship arranging were 
complex, difficult and inflexible.  
DSH-IS was slow with frequent 
auto-shutdown.    Finally, James 
wrote a web homepage showing the 
results, accessible to anyone with 
Internet facility. 
 
  Limitation of job duty: supported the technical, 
outsourcing to third-party and allowed a 
contract of DSH-IS for DP-1 division only. 
Stages 
Actors 
The First Stage 
(1997~2002) 
 The Second Stage 
(2005~) 
Customers Nature of Technology: 
Task too complicated and DSH-IS too rigid. 
 Nature of Technology: 
Although the technology was progressive, the 
complicated and flexible nature of ship 
arrangement processes could not be 
accommodated in DSH-IS. 
Technology Strategy: distrusted DSH-IS.  Technology Strategy: should achieve the three goals 
of fairness, equity, and transparency. 
Motivation: resisted DSH-IS totally. Motivation: computerization is the world trend. 
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Criteria of success: the extent to which it could 
achieve fairness, equity, and 
transparency. 
 Criteria of success: the extent to which it could 
achieve fairness, equity, and transparency. 
Vision: DSH-IS always inconsistent with the 
on-site situation, thus customers 
distrusted DSH-IS.  Therefore, they 
encouraged its failure. 
 Vision: waited for the second failure of DSH-IS. 
Accommodated planning: the employees of 
customers told their bosses the 
shortcomings of DSH-IS.  These 
bosses requested some privileges, 
pressing KaoKang and resisting 
DSH-IS. 
 Accommodated planning: customers raised as many 
questions as they could without explicitly 
standing against DSH-IS, and waited for a 
good presentation.  Customers still needed 
to have good relations with employees of 
DP-1 division in order to secure a good quay 
for their ships, and to benefit from other 
privileges. 
Technology in Use: job rights were jeopardized.  Technology in Use: suggested that KaoKang should 
replace the make-shift approach and 
eradicate the flaws in the ship arrangement 
processes. 
Priority: DSH-IS was threatening their job 
rights.  Most of them were relatives of 
their bosses.  These bosses could not 
fire them and so accepted all 
suggestions made by them about 
DSH-IS in order to relieve pressure. 
Priority: KaoKang should study the successful 
experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore.  
Resolve the problems of KaoKang first, 
then computerize. 
Usefulness: could not modify the function of 
DSH-IS to accommodate day-to-day 
problems. 
 Usefulness: impossible to replace ship arrangement 
job by DSH-IS forever. 
Stages 
Actors 
The First Stage 
(1997~2002) 




Had not assigned the consultants at this stage.  Nature of Technology: 
It was absolutely certain that computerization could 
arrange the quay for a ship if the rules were 
simplified. 
 Technology Strategy: there was a good chance of 
achieving the four goals of fairness, equity, 
transparency, and preservation of public 
rights. 
Motivation: this was a good chance to simplify the 
complicated rules of ship arrangement. 
Criteria of success: the function of manual 
modification should never be replaced by the 
new DSH-IS. 
Vision: this was a good chance to avoid the loophole, 
and an opportunity to achieve the four goals 
of fairness, equity, transparency and 
preservation of public rights. 
Accommodated planning: auxiliary DP-1 division 
revised the RFP and persuaded top mangers 
in each meeting. 
 Technology in Use: no substantial power. 
Priority: suggested eradication of the manual 
function.  However, because top managers 
rejected their ideas totally, consultants 
eventually gave up.  Because they had no 
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decision power, they felt incapable. 
Table 2. The Different Technological Frames of Five Actors in Two Stages of DSH-IS 
IMPLICATIONS 
This study has analyzed the power highlighted in the technological frames perspective of DSH-IS in KaoKang.  As a result, 
we are able to understand the insights of the technological frames gap among different actors over time from a theoretical 
perspective, and offer practical ways of managing those differences. 
Implications for Theory 
Technological frames have been used to understand the cognitive structure of organizations in the early stages of technology 
development.  Davidson (2002), Olikowski and Gash (1994) analyzed the cognitive gap among different kinds of actor in 
ISD.  Although they emphasized that power was the critical factor in the analyzed processes, they did not have enough data 
to support their view.  For this reason, the present paper not only adopted the technological frames of Olikowski and Gash 
(1994), but also enhanced the interpretation of power operative processes.  The paper interpreted the gap in technological 
frames among five kinds of actor (top managers, employees of DP-1 division, MIS professionals, consultants of KaoKang, 
and customers).  The paper emphasized how the subjects wield their power, and why the gap in technological frames among 
different actors in DSH-IS development processes occurs. 
Qualitative research cannot offer an independent interpretation without relative organizational characters and social cultural 
context.  In view of this, although this study adopted the same domains of technological frames with regard to Olikowski 
and Gash (1994) (nature of technology, technology strategy and technology-in-use), the findings have produced totally 
different insights.  Different methods of sense-making are used with the five kinds of actor present in KaoKang in the 
DSH-IS development processes.  In particular, the DSH-IS development processes have been shown to greatly influence 
some of the actors’ job rights, power and self-interests.  These events prompted the failure of the first stage of DSH-IS 
development processes, and was responsible for the unpredictability in the second stage.  Finally, with the exception of top 
managers, none of the actors had confidence in the success of the second round of DSH-IS development processes. 
Making longitudinal observations, this study finds that the cognitive technological frames of some actors changed due to time 
and technological developments, findings consistent with the perspective of El Sawy and Pauchant (1988), Gioia (1986), 
namely: 
(1) The technology strategy of top managers changed from ―assigned MIS department was to take responsibility for it‖ in the 
first stage to ―assigned DP department, MIS department, consultants of KaoKang and customers to form a coalition together‖ 
in the second stage.  In order to show their absolute power with respect to DSH-IS development processes, the strategy of 
top managers from one stage to another was driven by two equally important needs: to be successful and to save face. 
(2) The technology in use of top managers changed in the course of the DSH-IS implementation process. It started as 
―irrespective if how it was done, it was necessary to use the computer‖ in the first stage.  This changed to ―control the 
function of DSH-IS; it could help top managers maintain good relations with privileged clients in order to ensure future 
promotion.‖  Top managers changed their perspective when they discovered that ―maintaining good relations with privileged 
clients‖ was their power resource.  This became their top priority, superceding the four goals of fairness, equity, 
transparency and preservation of public rights, and the practical effectiveness of DSH-IS. 
(3) The nature of technology for the employees in DP-1 division and MIS professionals from ―DSH-IS was a mission 
impossible‖ in the first stage.  This changed to ―DSH-IS should be able to replace the manual ship arrangement process‖ in 
the second stage.  This change was due to the fact that both of these groups found that DSH-IS could be developed without 
their having to take responsibility for it, and that it would not affect their professional (domain) power. 
(4) The technology strategy of employees in DP-1 division changed from ―could be manipulated like a puppet‖ in the first 
stage to ―simplify the rules of ship arranging, but with no guarantee of success‖ in the second stage.  This change was made 
in order to preserve their power and self-interests after DSH-IS had been developed. 
(5) The technology in use of employees in DP-1 division changed from ―coalesced with customers to avoid losing their jobs‖ 
in the first stage to ―wrote RFP according to top managers’ requirement, but avoided involvement in customer conflict for 
reasons of self-preservation‖ in the second stage.  They refused to take responsibility for DSH-IS, and also retained their 
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official power in the ―ship arranging‖ job.  This result demonstrates the officials’ desire utterly to shirk their responsibilities. 
(6) The technology strategy of MIS professionals changed from ―advocated DSH-IS‖ in the first stage to ―only 
accommodated DP-1 division and did not guide DSH-IS‖ in the second stage.  This resulted from their understanding that 
there were many reasons that would influence the success of DSH-IS development processes and that the chances of success 
were very low.  They changed their strategy to retain their professional power.  This result betrayed the principle these 
officers were adhering to: the less they did, the fewer errors they would make. 
(7) The technology strategy and technology-in-use of customers changed from being ―afraid of losing their job, distrusting 
computers and resisting DSH-IS in the first stage‖ to ―cooperated superficially and undertook indirect fault-finding in the 
second stage.‖  In both stages, customers always cared about their job rights and the fairness of ―ship arranging.‖  The ship 
arranging result of DSH-IS also affected their position and power in the company, if the operation of DSH-IS is black box. 
With these technology frame changes, which can help management to understand how to employ usable factors as well as 
provide an appropriate method to change the perceptions of IS of employees in their difference positions within the 
organization, IS can be accepted more easily in the future. 
This paper offers the following three insights with regard to these phenomena: firstly, due to the fact that IS can change an 
organization’s power structure and benefits’ allocation, some resource allocators will use their relations to influence the 
direction of IS in order to protect their power and self-interests, as illustrated by the actors of employees of DP-1 division and 
customers in this study.  Secondly, some resource allocators will not consider the difficulties of implementing their ideas, 
leading them to shape the development of IS in a way that will ensure the saving of his/her face, as illustrated by the actor of 
top managers in this study.  Thirdly, some actors must satisfy the requirements of Chinese culture in order to maintain 
interpersonal harmony, giving face to rather than spiting others, and helping them to do their best.  In so doing, they expect 
others to repay their effort in the future (Bond & Lee 1981).  This is illustrated by the actors of top managers, MIS 
professionals, and consultants in this study. 
Implications for Practice 
This study reminds us that ISD can fail due to the wielding of power and self-interests in different organizational structures 
and cultures, even if it is a good and meaningful IS.  However, the failure could occur for different reasons in a western 
context.  This paper also finds that even an actor who is just, objective and unselfish (such as consultants in this study) 
cannot direct IS successfully if they are living in the context of public organizational culture.  In light of this, there are five 
suggestions to management: 
(1) Managers should consider adopting a team work approach in which team members take collective responsibility to avoid 
the danger of employees serving self-interests in different situations. 
(2) Before ISD, the plan, direction, content and goal of IS should be announced and explained in considerable detail.  This 
will help to avoid different actors wielding power and political behavior in the ISD and overshadowing the future direction of 
IS by actions driven by self-interest and power. 
(3) Managers should explain the extent to which the formal rules of the organization are flexible to avoid employees of 
different departments using these rules to control ISD.  This is a particularly important strategy in the public department. 
(4) Managers should have clear reward and punishment standards before ISD, in order to avoid employees of different 
departments exploiting ISD and shirking responsibility for decisions. 
In light of this, management should understand the different kinds of cognition among actors (technological frames).  Finally, 
management should also recognize the way in which these key actors will use their status and expert knowledge to wield 
power in ISD.  In-depth understanding from this perspective will promote smoother ISD and will avoid unnecessary 
manipulated power events. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated the power operation in information system (IS) development processes, exploring the 
psychological mechanism of individuals from the micro perspective.  The study analyzed the gap in technological frames 
among different actors, assessing how these actors wield power to achieve their self-interested goals and impede DSH-IS 
development process.  To this end, the study collected data from –KaoKang –a port authority.  We attempted to understand 
different key actors in a particular context with technological frame gaps in ISD, to help other similar organizations to avoid 
similar problems when implementing ISD.  It is hoped that the study will further reduce the number of negative outcomes of 
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ISD in organizations. 
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